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Abstract 
We investigate the investment style positioning of UK equity unit trusts (mutual funds) over the 24-year 
period from 1987 to 2010 and assess if fund manager claims to follow a particular style strategy are 
evidenced in practice. Generally, UK unit trusts do not, in fact, consistently track declared styles but subject 
their funds to style switching or rotation. Nor do funds switch to become simple index trackers, as has 
widely been reported, but exhibit a mix of behaviour that we refer to as ‘market-momentum styling’. Our 
contribution is to offer a coherent, end-to-end picture of the evolution of investment styles over an economic 
cycle. In so doing we evidence that fund style positioning is subject to rotation and becomes subordinated 
to past portfolio performance or style momentum. Even this result is conditional as we go on to demonstrate 
that style investment is very likely to be driven by broader economic conditions, thereby creating market-
momentum styling by default. This is arguably not a style at all and calls into question the intent behind 
fund ‘strategies’. 
Keywords: Unit trusts, style investing, momentum 
JEL classification: G11 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mutual funds (unit trusts) categorise their investment styles along lines that are likely to be easily 
recognisable by the investor community (Sharpe 1992; Brown and Goetzman 1995; Conrad and Kaul 1998; 
Chan, et al. 2002; Barberis and Shleifer 2003). This not only assists investors in determining the risk-return 
profiles of funds (Lynch and Musto 2003), but also clearly benefits fund managers in terms of fund 
marketing and fee generation (Jain and Wu 2000).  
If funds are positioned to match a particular style then a style benchmark or index is ordinarily used against 
which performance might be evaluated (MacDonald 1974; Ward and Saunders 1976; Quigley and 
Sinquefield 2000; Fletcher and Forbes 2002). Whilst the style positioning of a fund might seem 
straightforward, the causes of under/over-performance are somewhat harder to determine. For example, 
consider the potential causes of style drift where fund positioning loses contact with a targeted benchmark. 
One view might be that style drift arises as a consequence of poor investment timing. Certainly, the near-
overwhelming evidence, accumulated from across the world, is that fund managers do not exhibit timing 
ability (Henriksson 1984; Fletcher 1995; Byrne et al. 2006; Cuthbertson et al. 2008). An alternative view 
of fund manager performance might conclude that style drift arises from an undeclared investment style 
switching strategy. The incentive to switch style could arise as a response to, for example, previous poor 
fund performance which leads managers to seek other benchmarks that offer a better view of fund 
performance. In such circumstances assessment of fund manager performance becomes difficult: fund 
performance is clouded, investors cannot make risk-based investment decisions, and fund evaluation is at 
risk of being re-directed to a benchmark against which performance ‘looks good’ (Lehman and Modest 
1987).  
Our research seeks to examine these issues and uncover mutual fund style switching strategies. Our 
contribution is to offer a coherent, end-to-end picture of the evolution of investment styles over an economic 
cycle. Some of the initial parts of our research have previously been reported but, in drawing together what 
is already known, and adding new evidence on style rotation and its relationship to momentum and market 
states, we are able to show how fund investment styles evolve. We do this by evidencing the performance 
of funds to show why style switching is likely to take place. In so doing, we report a significant role for 
momentum – a finding generally not found for the UK. We reveal which funds are likely to rotate style and 
report the extent of style switching. We show that, ultimately, investment styles are subordinated to prior 
period performance in an attempt to improve/maintain performance over different market states. In such 
circumstances, market-momentum styling arises.  
The next section explains why our research questions emerge from the core of the debate on fund 
performance evaluation and explains how our analytical method addresses the following research questions. 
Is style investing profitable? Do fund managers make consistent style choices? What is the evidence for 
style switching? If styles are switched, what style is adopted? We address these questions by first assessing 
mutual fund style positioning in the UK over a 24-year period from 1987 to 2010, using a near-population 
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sample of mutual funds. Employing the factor approach of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) we 
demonstrate that a momentum-based style strategy is very likely to be the style of choice for fund managers, 
irrespective of declared styles. However, these results are not unconditional and we show that momentum 
is, in turn, driven by broader macroeconomic forces thus leading to questions over whether fund investment 
style is determined by strategic intent or emerges as a strategic default.  
2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Investors pursue style investing as one method of categorisation as a means of simplifying problems related 
to choice (Brown and Goetzmann 1997; Mullainathna 2000; Barberis and Shleifer 2003). Equity fund 
managers position their funds to reflect investor appetite and thus opportunities for style investing are 
created (Bernstein 1995). So, what should investors look for in a mutual fund and how should they frame 
their choice between competing funds? These quite natural questions lead into the academic debate and 
underline the relevance of our own research questions. The key to what follows is to understand how fund 
performance is evaluated by the identification of superior information as measured by mean-variance 
efficient portfolios. The issues are deeply related and provide both theoretical and empirical contexts for 
our own work.  
2.1  Superior information and mean-variance efficiency 
Fund managers participate in a market where they can exploit their superior information to create bankable 
economic rents from selling their fund management services. This requires information asymmetry between 
the fund managers and other participants to make their services worth paying-for (Jensen 1969). Fund 
managers alter fund portfolios to exploit their superior information and, because the superior information 
is private, this implies a fund position which is different to that which would be selected by an uninformed 
investor. However, the existence of portfolios created on the basis of private, superior information presents 
a deep problem for performance evaluation since uninformed investors cannot create benchmarks that 
reflect the private information set that fund managers use and hence exact fund performance evaluation 
becomes impossible (Admati and Ross 1985; Grinblatt and Titman 1993). From an uninformed observer’s 
viewpoint, inexactness in performance evaluation may give the image that the fund portfolio plots below 
the security market line and appears not to be mean-variance efficient (Grinblatt and Titman 1989b). This 
key observation results in the possibility that fund managers are very likely to be mis-evaluated when they 
have superior information. It is possible, however, for investors to control for unknown private information 
by conditioning on realised returns (Admati and Ross 1985), an issue we expand upon below, so that 
empirical investigation remains possible. Hence, key questions concerning performance evaluation 
theoretically are linked deeply with empirical problems of identifying and measuring appropriate 
benchmarks concerning evaluation of superior performance. Notwithstanding the empirical difficulties, we 
should not expect to see abnormal performance generally since fund managers with the talent and resources 
to deliver abnormal performance will have the know-how to extract this economic rent in fees and related 
costs to their maxima, leaving zero-profit for the investors at the margin (Admati and Pfleiderer 1990).  
3 
 
The link between superior information and mean-variance efficiency is further described by Grinblatt and 
Titman (1989b) who argue that realized positive performance from managed portfolios must be due to 
alterations in portfolio weights as a response to superior information. This presumes that the efficiency of the 
index used to compute the performance cannot be rejected. In other words, superior active management is 
rewarded and can be identified by appropriate construction of mean-variance efficient portfolios. The 
question then turns to how mean-variance efficiency might be achieved and what is the specific relationship 
to the detection of unknown private, superior information.  
Admati and Ross (1985) explore the conditions under which traditional risk return measures are able to 
detect superior performance. Asymmetric information implies heterogeneous beliefs amongst investors and 
hence there is no special role for market portfolio, a fact which does not contradict the observation that 
differential beliefs can still remain mean-variance efficient (Admati and Ross 1985). What is required is 
that an uninformed investor derives his/her own security market line and portfolio on the efficient frontier 
which will be reflective of equilibrium prices. The statistical problem is how to unravel and determine the 
risk factors of a portfolio where the joint distribution of fund returns and risk factors are confounded by 
unobservable private (superior) information signals. The answer for fund performance evaluation is to 
recognise that superior information is, in fact, correlated with ex post realisations of prices as well as with 
benchmarks created on the basis of ‘coarser information’ (Dybvig and Ross 1985; Admati and Ross 1985).  
A definition of ‘coarse’ benchmarks is provided in Grinblatt and Titman (1989a) who indicate that an 
appropriate benchmark needs only consist of those assets that can be included in the fund portfolio. If a 
style declaration is made by a fund then the universe of stocks that qualify for inclusion can be narrowed. 
Intuitively, therefore, the question can be turned to which appropriate benchmark is needed for the stocks 
that should be included in a fund portfolio out of the qualifying universe. The choice of candidate factors 
is indicated for the investor from the style declaration of funds. Researchers then test candidate factors 
against mean-variance efficient portfolios, initially by Jensen’s (1968) Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). However, CAPM is both theoretically and empirically unsuitable as a benchmark model for fund 
management.1 As an alternative, more general k-factor models show that proxy portfolios can be mean-
variance efficient and that all sets of k-factor portfolios are mean-variance efficient as the number of 
securities increase (Grinblatt and Titman 1985). Thus the k-factor approach is both theoretically and 
empirically a necessity.   
2.2 Analytical methods 
The two broad analytical methods used by researchers in examining fund performance and establishing 
appropriate benchmarks are characteristics-based and returns-based approaches. Characteristics-based 
methods are distinguished from returns-based methods in that they use, as their source data, the actual 
holdings of fund portfolios. This requires examination of fund stock holdings on a monthly basis, which is 
the highest frequency most easily available (Morningstar and Lipper).2 We employ a returns-based method 
of analysis to identify benchmark factors and factor loadings. There are two key empirical advantages to 
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our approach. First, factor models maintain closer connections to the empirical asset pricing literature in 
their approach to identify risk factors. Factors models which are derived from the k-factor linear model 
(Jensen 1968, 1969) contain properties which are well-known, particularly with respect to the conditions 
under which Jensen’s alpha may be interpreted as meaningful in relation to fund performance evaluation 
(Lehman and Modest 1987).3 Second, our weekly data availability and sampling frequency maintain a 
closer connection to meaningful interpretation of our style-based tests than would a characteristics-based 
approach based on monthly sampling. The additional information content in weekly sampling, and in other 
data construction approaches we explain below, support identification of mean-variance efficient portfolios 
which we have argued is central to an analysis of fund performance4. This approach will support the 
accuracy (power statistics) of the results and the resulting inference (Kothari and Warner 2001). Wermers 
(2012) argues that returns-based measures sampled at a higher frequency may add further information on fund 
manager behaviour in relation to style drift. In essence, weekly sampling is more likely to capture portfolio 
changes than is monthly sampling if weekly sampling mimics more closely the frequency of managerial decision 
points. 
There are a number of factor-based approaches in the literature that reflect choice within the k-factor 
approach. The Fama and French (1993) three-factor (3F) model is a variant of Sharpe’s (1992) general 
model and an extension of CAPM. The additional risk factors relate to size and value and are reflective of 
two main style categorisations that have been extensively investigated. As might be expected, there is 
significant empirical support for a factor-based approach which has underlined the approaches’ longevity 
in the literature. Chan et al. (2002) report, in an empirical US study, that the parsimonious 3F model 
performs as well as more elaborate factor models on out-of-sample returns predictions tests. Our specific 
method of style classification follows that of Chan et al. (2002) which employ two key risk dimensions, 
market capitalization and value-growth, augmented by momentum. The purpose in undertaking this 
approach, as Chan et al. (2002) explain, is that it mimics (for the two key dimensions) the approach largely 
employed by the mutual fund industry. Since it is our objective to uncover the investment intentions versus 
investment outcomes of the fund industry, our analytical approach has to be in sympathy with their activities 
to reveal the concentration and consistency of fund styles. As we go on to discuss, such an approach allows 
us to make direct inferences concerning the intentionality of fund style management.  
In a further important extension, Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) showed that stocks that perform well over a 
three to twelve month period tend to continue to do so over the subsequent three to twelve months, the 
results of which are confirmed in a large number of subsequent studies (see, e.g., Chan et al. 1996; Conrad 
and Kaul 1998; Jegadeesh and Titman 2001). This is referred to as regular momentum and is based on a 
zero-cost replicating portfolio strategy that goes long in past winners and shorts past losers. Substantial out-
of-sample evidence shows that the momentum effect is not likely due to a data snooping bias, and also 
appears to be significantly and economically profitable in many European markets. The momentum effect 
is small (see, e.g., Doukas and McKnight 2005) but positive in many emerging markets (see, e.g., 
Rouwenhorst 1999), and has been observed in some Asian markets (see, e.g., Chui et al. 2000). Studies of 
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price momentum strategies based on individual firms have also been extended to portfolio-based 
momentum strategies in a number of different contexts (see, e.g., Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999; Lee and 
Swaminathan 2000; Hong et al. 2000; Zhang 2006; Avramov et al. 2007). Despite these fairly widespread 
findings and despite the implications for efficient markets, momentum profits appear to persist (Jagadeesh 
and Titman 2001; Schwert 2003). The risk-based explanations of Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggest that 
momentum is a result of unexpected cross-sectional variations in expected returns due to variations in risk. 
Behavioural explanations of momentum have relied on cognitive bias (Daniel et al. 1998; Hong and Stein 
1999) and that this bias is manifested in up-markets arising from overconfidence and self-attribution.  
Extending regular price momentum research to fund managers and looking for evidence of fund momentum 
styles is a relatively recent finding. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) have demonstrated that stocks can co-vary 
because they are associated with a particular style. Boyer (2011) has recently shown, however, that 
economically meaningless index labels cause stock returns to covary in excess of fundamentals. This 
suggests that the act of categorisation alone is enough to alter returns. In a paper relevant to our own results, 
Chen and De Bondt (2004) report that style portfolios of US funds exhibit momentum related to market 
cycles. As an interesting and rather telling counter-point, Chan et al. (2009) undertake an analysis of fund 
style performance techniques (characteristics versus returns) that specifically excludes momentum on the 
grounds that it is not a style on which fund manage performance is assessed (institutional clients, they argue, 
benchmark to passive indices). We reject this approach since our basic hypothesis is that an undeclared 
style strategy is, in fact, operating and hence such an assumption, as used in Chan et al. (2009) would be 
inappropriate in our circumstances. 
2.3 Research questions 
We first benchmark our data to a variety of standard market indices to ensure that our sample contains no 
idiosyncratic elements that may undermine inference and the basis of comparability of our results. Having 
adopted a returns-based, factor methodology we seek next to explain how specifically our research 
questions are addressed.  
In examining the research question ‘is style investing profitable’, we estimate both the Fama and French 
(1993) 3F model and the Carhart (1997) four-factor (4F) model to benchmark our data to evidence on fund 
manager performance to other studies. This allows us to be confident in establishing what particular style 
aspects of our data are evident. The approach has two parts: the first part concerns an examination of the 
significance of style factors against widely-used and known investment approaches (the ‘battery of style 
indexes’, referred-to above). If we are to uncover intentionality in the fund industry with respect to style 
choices we must look, first, at what style declarations are made and, only then, examine whether styles are 
consistently followed. Our proposals are based on a rejection of declared style intentions and, hence, an 
examination of widely-used investment approaches must be our starting point. The two key style 
categorisations are value-growth orientations and size. The metrics employed are B/M ratios and market 
capitalization. The second part concerns a style declaration which is not generally reported but we suspect 
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to be empirically important. That is, we report for the first time for the UK a significant role for momentum. 
The Carhart (1997) 4F model is then consequently adopted as our benchmark factor model for the 
subsequent analysis. The research question then looks to ascertain abnormal performance, as related to 
style, from the factor regressions we perform. 
The next research question addressed is ‘do fund managers make consistent style choices’. The validity of 
inference, here, depends on the identification of meaningful factor loadings established in relation to the 
previous research question and then to an examination of investment styles being maintained over a period 
of time. In this context we look at the stability of factor loadings over time specifically in relation to the 
ranking position of a fund. The rankings are separated into quartiles which allows, we suggest, sufficient 
distinction between funds to recognise meaningful differences in style. That is, we accept that factor 
loadings may vary and which has been widely reported (example.g., Brown and Goetzmann 1997) but that 
fund positioning within a style category determined by rank should not vary if style positioning is constant: 
a change in factor ranking, we argue, is tantamount to a change in style. The degree to which ranking alters 
is subject to statistical tests and the inferences drawn by standard statistical methods. We do not leave the 
issue resting at this point and we then look for confirmatory evidence to back-up assertions concerning 
style change which leads us to the next research question ‘what is the reason for style shifting’.  
We conjecture that there exists a relation between past performance and style shift for UK unit trusts as the 
under-pinning of any incentive to alter style. We rank styles, as before, but further examine the role and 
impact of momentum. That is, we employ the same methodological approach to ensure inference is 
consistent between the two questions concerning style profitability and style consistency. The statistical 
approach we adopt is to sort unit trusts into portfolios on the basis of a two-way, within-group classification 
to accommodate examination of the impact of past performance as measured by momentum. We examine 
style rank changes conditioned on past performance. With meaningful separation of styles into quartiles, 
standard statistical tests then support inferential evaluations of our research question and we are able to 
conclude that poor past performance precedes style change. 
Having established that styles alter as a result of poor past performance, we naturally then ask ‘what style 
is pursued’ in the face of poor past performance. Our results of analysing this question thus close the loop, 
as it were, on the evolution of style alteration. We look to the macro-economy for an explanation and test 
specifically for the impact of style cycles. There is some evidence for this in relation to Chen and De Bondt 
(2004), but there is no work, to our knowledge, that additionally places style shifting in the context of 
momentum and past poor performance as the underlying dynamic for style ‘management’. Importantly, we 
link this specifically to the debate concerning evaluations of superior information by hypothesising that 
alpha values derived from the Carhart (1997) 4F model and market state combine to determine fund 
switching. That is, fund style is ‘managed’ by switching style to a style more out-of-tune with down-market 
characteristics and more in-tune with up-market characteristics as determined by prior period performance. 
Our conjectures are supported by statistical tests that support our inferences that relate past performance, 
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style change, and market state. In a broad context, therefore, the consistency of our results emerges as a 
picture of style management that enables inferences concerning ubiquitous style changes in the face of past 
poor performance, overlaid by the impact of market conditions. 
Our approach supports our research aim which is to provide a more complete story as to the motives and 
outcomes of fund style management. Our conclusions are based on a comprehensive examination of the 
investment styles of UK equity unit trusts over the 24-year period from 1987 to 2010 and find the following: 
a large fraction of the UK unit trusts employ a small size investment style approach with B/M values skewed 
toward high B/M values. We also find that small size trusts outperform big size trusts, while value-oriented 
trusts perform better than growth-oriented trusts. However, styles are not consistently held at individual 
fund level nor are they profitable after accounting for risk adjusted returns in the Carhart (1997) 4F model. 
We demonstrate how poor prior fund performance then leads to style switching and identify which fund 
styles are likely to switch. We then relate this evidence to show how market states are actually the key 
drivers of fund style positioning.  
3. DATA AND AVERAGE FUND PERFORMANCE 
This study examines investment styles of UK unit trusts authorised for sale to the public from January 1987 
through December 2010.5 We identify our sample of unit trusts focusing their assets on UK equities during 
the sample period. A unit trust that was merged, wound up, changed the investment objective, or changed 
to an Open-Ended Investment Company (OEIC) during the sample period is treated as a termination, while 
name change and transfer of a unit trust is treated as a continuation of the original trust. Our sample includes 
a maximum of 617 equity unit trusts, which exist for some or all of the entire data period. Therefore, data 
on dead unit trusts are available as well to control the presence of a survivorship bias, although this bias 
may be less worrisome when analysing fund styles (Chan et al. 2002). Total return indices on unit trusts 
from the first Wednesday of 1987 to the last Wednesday of 2010 are collected for each week. The total 
return index collected from DataStream assumes that dividends are re-invested.  
<Table 1> 
Table 1 reports the number of UK equity unit trusts at the end of each calendar year over the sample period. 
The size of the sample grows from a low of 52 at the end of 1987 to a high of 617 at the end of 2010, with 
particularly high growth during the early 2000s. To measure the aggregate performance of unit trusts, we 
calculate the equal-weighted weekly returns on all unit trusts and then compound to obtain the calendar 
year returns. In addition, this table compares the performance of our sample with the performance of a 
series of UK market indices, including the FTSE 100 Index, the FTSE 250 Index, the FTSE 350 Index, the 
FTSE All-share Index, and the FTSE SmallCap Index.6 The average return on UK unit trusts of 9.90% per 
year over the sample period is higher than the average annual return on any of the market indices and is in 
contrast with that of US mutual funds reported by Chan et al. (2002), and which may be a factor in 
explaining some differences in results we report below. In particular, the average annual over-performance 
of 2.12% relative to the FTSE All-share Index is higher than 1.3-2.0%, the range of estimates of UK equity 
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unit trusts’ expense ratios. The standard deviation shows that unit trusts have a lower risk (standard 
deviation = 14.82% per year) compared with every other index.  
Our results are reported gross of fees and transactions costs. This is in common with many other researchers 
but we note some important observations on the work done by researchers who have looked in detail at the 
issues involved which are neither straightforward nor always immediately apparent. Wermers (2000) report 
that over the period 1975 to 1994, US fund managers, on average, beat the market by 1.3%, gross, but 
produced a negative return after average fees and transactions costs of 1.6%. Fund trading, as opposed to 
total return, is generally profitable for US managers in that stocks that are bought outperform the stocks 
sold by 2% per year (Chen, et al. 2000). Lesmond et al. (2004) report that momentum profits are illusory 
because the stocks exhibiting greatest momentum have the highest trading costs giving rise to transaction 
costs as high as 12%. However, their paper is concerned with estimating transactions costs without 
reference to who the buyer is. In our case, it is a mutual fund. There are two implications for this. First, 
they pay lower transactions costs than nearly every other buyer. Second, in the US particularly, both closed-
end, and even more so open-ended, funds are restricted in their buying of illiquid stocks.7 The economic 
argument is straightforward: mutual funds must meet the liquidity requirements of the shareholders who 
wish to cash-in their mutual fund holdings. Hence, mutual funds are restricted in the purchases of illiquid 
stocks and so the results of Lesmond et al. (2004) do not automatically transfer to mutual funds. 
As to direct estimates of mutual fund costs, Karceski et al. (2005) report total trading costs as a proportion 
of expense ratios for US equity funds for 2002. They report their analysis by investment style and estimate 
the highest proportion, unsurprisingly, for small-growth funds at 123% of expense ratios. In the UK, 
expense ratios on average are no higher than 2% (see, e.g., Quigley and Sinquefield 2000) and, using 
Karceski et al. (2005) estimate, would give rise to total, average round trip costs of 4.46% for the costliest 
of funds.8 On the basis of the analysis to follow, only small/high value styles produce an alpha that would 
result in a return in excess of this. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Is style investing profitable? 
Our purpose in this section is to demonstrate that our data set has the characteristic relationship between 
style investing and performance that would be expected but go on to show in using these results why style 
rotation emerges as a response to poor performance. We achieve this by, first, benchmarking our data using 
both the Fama and French (1993) 3F model and the augmented model incorporating momentum to produce 
the Carhart (1997) 4F model. This allows us to compare our basic results with those published and to 
identify the specific relationship between style investment and unit trust performance for the data employed. 
Second, in comparing the 3F and 4F results we demonstrate how momentum adds to our understanding of 
fund behavior. Our intention in separately reporting the 3F and 4F model results is to explicitly identify and 
report on the impact of momentum on alpha performance for our sample. We do this to identify the smoking 
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gun that leads us to investigate why momentum plays the role it does: that is, in terms of being the outcome 
of previous decisions to switch styles as a result of previous poor fund performance.9 
The returns-based analysis of mutual fund holdings use a number of factor models: the CAPM, the Fama 
and French (1993) 3F model, and the Carhart (1997) 4F model. In the 3F model unit trusts’ loadings on 
market, size and B/M factors are derived from: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 , (1) 
where Ri represents the return on unit trust i in week t, Rf represents the return on a three-month UK Treasury 
bill, Rm represents the return on the FTSE All-share Index. SMBt and HMLt represent the returns on zero-
investment factor-mimicking portfolios for size and B/M, respectively. The factor sensitivities or loadings, 
bi, si, and hi are the slopes in the time-series regression.  
We separately report results using the Carhart (1997) 4F model: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 , (2) 
where MOMt represents the return on a zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolio for price momentum 
(return over the prior year), other variables are as defined in equation (1). 
In estimating equations (1) and (2) we construct portfolios that mimic the size and value factors in the UK 
stock market. On 30 June of each year t from 1987 to 2010, all available stocks listed on the LSE (excluding 
financial firms, such as banks, insurance firms, real estate firms, and other financial service firms) are 
divided into two size groups, small (S) or big (B), according to whether their market values are below or 
above the median market value of all stocks. All stocks are also divided into three value groups, high B/M 
(H), medium B/M (M), or low B/M (L), according to whether the values of their B/M at the end of year t – 
1 are included in the top 30, middle 40, or bottom 30 percentile, respectively. We then construct six 
portfolios from the intersections of two size groups and three value groups in June of year t and calculate 
weekly value-weighted returns on the six portfolios from July of year t to June of year t + 1.  
Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997), we construct the momentum factor (MOM). 
MOM represents the equal-weighted return on a zero-investment portfolio formed by subtracting the mean 
return on a loser portfolio composed of stocks with the lowest 10% eleven-month returns lagged one month 
from the mean return on a winner portfolio composed of stocks with the highest 10% eleven-month returns 
lagged one month.  
Previous style studies typically employ a 36-month rolling window to obtain si and hi in each year, and then 
to calculate the average value of si and hi over the whole sample period. Rekenthaler et al. (2004), however, 
argue that information or data based on a 36-month rolling window is restricted as fund managers may have 
changed their style during the 36-month period. That is, this sort of style analysis gives equal weighting to 
the 36-month returns, resulting in, on average, 18-month old information that risks saying little about the 
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current style. In order to address this potential shortcoming and to give a more accurate analysis of 
investment style, we enhance the frequency of data employing a 52-week rolling window instead of a 36-
month window. Obviously, there are 52 observations for each regression and the information is only, on 
average, six-months old, which arguably gives a better view of the UK unit trust investment style.  
<Tables 2(a) & 2(b)> 
We report in Table 2(a) the estimates for equation (1), the 3F model, based on equal and value weighted 
portfolios. The equivalent estimates for equation (2), the 4F model, are reported in Table 2(b). Using the 
3F results alone, fund managers appear to produce significant alpha estimates using both equal and value 
weighted portfolios. The average alpha estimate for equal weighted funds in Panel A is 0.033% per week 
or 1.75% per year (1.27% per year for value weighted funds in Panel B). This is predictably lower than the 
risk-unadjusted return reported for all funds in Table 1 of 2.12%. Importantly, at an average value 1.97%, 
the risk-adjusted estimated alphas are likely to be below fees and transactions costs for the average fund. 
This finding is consistent with previous studies that report fund managers underperforming the market after 
controlling for the market, size, and B/M factors. For example, Cuthbertson et al. (2008) report that there 
are around 2-5% of top performing US and UK equity mutual funds which beat their benchmarks while 
around 20-40% of funds underperform their benchmarks. Moreover, alpha estimates vary by style, as we 
might expect. The evidence shows that value-oriented trusts outperform growth-oriented trusts by between 
2.5-3.3% per year (2.5% for value weighting in Panel B; and 3.3% for equal weighting in Panel A). The 
findings are inconsistent with results shown in the US. For example, Davis (2001) document that value-
oriented funds obtained abnormal –2.75% returns. Chan et al. (2002) also observe that in general, growth 
funds outperformed value funds by 1.72% per year in the US market. But our finding are consistent with 
Quigley and Sinquefield (2000), who examine the performance of all UK equity unit trusts over the period 
from 1978 to 1997 and record that value-oriented trusts outperform growth-oriented trusts. Our evidence 
further shows that the gap difference between value and growth trusts is mainly driven by a size effect with 
small unit trusts outperforming big trusts by 4.8% per year for equal weighted results (3.3% per year for 
value weighted). That is, small firms with high value earn more than big firms with high value. On the other 
hand, small size trusts outperform big size trusts. The difference of the average alpha between the small 
and big size portfolios is 2.2% per year for equal weighted trusts and 1.25% for value weighted. The size 
effect largely accounts for the differences we observe between value weighted and equal weighted funds 
(value weighted returns are lower than equal weighted returns, which is consistent with the evidence of 
better performance for small size funds). 
The t-statistic estimates in Table 2(a) shows that alphas are only significantly different from zero as funds 
approach the value end of the style spectrum. Whilst alpha estimates are universally lower for the value 
weighted results, the significance and inference of the estimates is largely unaltered. Our general conclusion 
in using the 3F model is that fund managers do outperform the market for small and value styles, but 
generally not in excess of reasonable estimates of fees and transactions costs. 
11 
 
This picture changes and the performance analysis radically alters when momentum is introduced, the 
results of which are reported in Table 2(b). In this case, average alpha performance falls to 0.57% per year 
for equal weighting (0.36% for value weighting) compared with the 1.75% (1.27% for value weighting) 
reported in Table 2(a). Overall, momentum seems to account for excess fund performance identified for the 
3F model. In every case, the momentum coefficient estimate is statistically significant, with the highest 
significance exhibited at the value styles.10 It would not be unreasonable to conclude that risk adjusting for 
momentum accounts for excess returns in the 3F model. Only one estimate of alpha is significant in Panel 
A and none remains significant in Panel B once momentum is accounted for. 
The results in Table 2(b) are consistent with the role of momentum described in Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). That is, small-cap or value-oriented unit trusts normally buy stocks with past good performance 
and hence benefit from the momentum effect, while the momentum effect works against big-cap or growth-
oriented trusts, which generally invest in stocks with past poor performance. Thus, for example, the average 
value for the momentum loading in the equal weighted (Panel A) growth portfolios is –0.007% per week, 
while the figure for the value portfolios is 0.052% per week. The average value for the big portfolio is –
0.002% per week, while the figure for the small portfolio is 0.033% per week. All the figures are statistically 
significant and directional signs are consistent between equal and value weighted portfolios.  
The role of momentum is thus important in scale, scope, direction and significance. It appears also to 
contribute to our understanding of fund performance. In Table 2(a) we observe significant alphas 
particularly with respect to value-positioned funds but that, once momentum is accounted for in Table 2(b), 
all of the excess return measured by alpha has disappeared with the exception of small-value style 
combinations for equal weighted portfolios (even this disappears for value weighting). The conclusion 
appears that fund managers do not generally offer returns above the risk factors identified in the 4F models. 
This result is reported gross of fees and transactions costs. Notwithstanding the difficulties of estimating 
actual total costs, our results confirm that for the style classifications we have identified, no fund would 
produce a profit (positive alpha) after reasonable costs are accounted for.  
Our conclusion from this stage of analysis is that fund managers do not in general make excess risk adjusted 
returns for their clients. Moreover, fund styling – in every style classification we observe – is subject to a 
statistically significant momentum effect. We also specifically observe excess risk adjusted returns 
disappearing when moving from estimating the 3F model to the 4F model. In other words, all funds are 
momentum funds to one degree or another and are associated with zero excess returns when momentum is 
incorporated into the analysis. When momentum is not accounted for, positive alphas appear for value-
orientated funds. In the light of the evidence of a pervasive momentum effect and zero alpha performance, 
we examine how investment style adapts to prior performance. That is, with momentum an important factor, 
we assess what happens to investment style when fund performance varies. There is no logic in a fund 
manager using momentum to chase losses and every incentive for an inactive fund manager to continue 
with a winning momentum formula. The former would naturally shift or rotate styles, the latter would not. 
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The next section then looks at the evidence of style switching followed by an exploration of the reasons for 
style shifting. 
4.2 Do fund managers make consistent style choices? 
This paper uses a style classification scheme that is widely used in the mutual fund and pension fund 
industry.11 Specifically, the style categories are based on two dimensions: the market capitalisation (size) 
and the value-growth (B/M) orientations and which reflects the patterns of allocation of much of investor 
savings (Chan et al. 2002). In this section, we examine the style consistency of UK unit trusts by comparing 
the rank of a unit trust’s past and future regression loadings instead of directly comparing regression 
loadings. This is because a trust’s regression loading figure with respect to size and B/M may fluctuate over 
the years, but the unit trust’s style rank may stay the same over a number of years and which, we argue, is 
more suggestive of style consistency. This remains within the spirit of Brown and Goetzmann (1997) who 
allow variable factor loadings in their model of trust returns and also recognises the large amount of 
evidence which shows that fund managers vary their investment objectives over time (see, e.g., Gallo and 
Lockwood 1999).12 
Having established the role of momentum, we now only report results based on the 4F model and use this 
as our benchmark model. We also report only results for equal weighted portfolios.13 At the end of each 
calendar year we estimate the 4F model for every unit trust with a complete history of weekly returns over 
the prior one year. The estimated loadings on either size or B/M factor are ranked and scaled to fall between 
zero (for the lowest-ranked unit trust) and one (for the highest-ranked unit trust). In particular, as the lowest 
rank is set at 0, the second lowest rank is 0 + [(1 – 0) / (the number of the trusts)] × 1; the third lowest rank 
is 0 + [(1 – 0) / (the number of the trusts)] × 2; until the highest rank 1. A high (low) rank indicates that the 
unit trust is relatively more extreme in its orientation toward small (big) size equities or toward value 
(growth) equities. Style consistency is measured as the correlation between a trust’s current style rank 
measured at year end and its future style rank measured at the end of the following year. A high correlation 
is interpreted as a high level of style consistency.  
<Table 3> 
Table 3 reports the results on the basis of the pooled sample of unit trust-year observations. The style 
consistency for all unit trusts is relatively high for the size dimension but low for the B/M dimension. For 
example, the correlations between the current and future loadings are 65.59% (standard error = 0.0290) 
for the size dimension and 28.31% (standard error = 0.1609) for the B/M dimension. We further investigate 
style consistency with respect to size and B/M characteristics: size ranks are divided into big-cap trusts 
(trusts in the top 25% with the highest style rank on size) and small-cap trusts (trusts in the bottom 25% 
with the lowest style rank on size). B/M ranks are divided into value trusts (trusts in the top 25% with the 
highest style rank on B/M) and growth trusts (trusts in the bottom 25% with the lowest style rank on B/M). 
Style correlations are calculated for each group. The results show that correlations for size are consistently 
higher than they are for value although for both size and value there are statistically significant differences 
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between past and future style positioning. For example, for the size dimension, big-cap trusts have an 
average absolute correlation difference of 12.96% (standard error = 0.0568) between past and future style 
ranks at the 5% significance level, while for the B/M dimension, growth trusts have a correlation difference 
of 27.31% (standard error = 0.1115) at the 5% significance level. The average absolute differences in style 
ranks provide consistent information that mutual funds do not exhibit consistent factor loadings; in fact, 
they vary sufficiently to alter their ranking. What we observe are changes in fund style positioning that 
recognises the significant role that momentum plays in fund performance. In this context, it would appear 
that fund managers are changing fund style but the question remains as to what is driving this change. The 
next stage in our analysis looks to determine which individual factor can help explain fund rotation. 
4.3 What is the reason for style shifting? 
Prior US studies reveal that funds with poor past performance are more likely to change their investment 
styles (see, e.g., Chan et al. 2002; Lynch and Musto 2003). We conjecture that there exists a relation 
between past performance and style shift for UK unit trusts. To test this, we sort unit trusts into portfolios 
on the basis of a two-way within-group classification. The first sort is by a unit trust’s past performance 
(the compounding return on the unit trust over the prior one year), and the second sort is by the unit trust’s 
size and B/M loadings. We then compare each group’s current style rank with its future style rank 
(measured in the subsequent one year) and calculate the mean absolute difference of ranks. We interpret 
large mean absolute relative differences as evidence of greatest style change. 
In the classification by past unit trust performance, there are four groups: Group 1 (winners) comprises the 
top quartile of unit trusts with the highest past returns; Group 2 comprises the next lowest quartile, and so 
on until losers are defined as Group 4. Within each of these four groups, unit trusts are sorted by their rank 
with respect to size or B/M and assigned into one of four quartiles. The style of unit trusts with respect to 
size and to B/M is its loadings on the size and B/M factors, respectively, estimated from the Carhart (1997) 
4F regressions. The past style of each portfolio with respect to size and B/M is then compared with its 
future style. For each of the resulting 16 portfolios, the simple average for the size or B/M ranks across all 
member unit trusts is calculated at the end of the portfolio formation year to give the portfolio’s past style 
and at the end of the subsequent year to give its future style. The weighted average across all portfolio 
formation years is reported, where the weights are the number of unit trusts in each year. Also reported is 
the weighted average of the mean absolute differences between the past and future characteristic ranks 
across all unit trusts within each portfolio.14 
<Table 4> 
Panel A of Table 4 reveals the relation between style drift with respect to the size dimension and past 
performance. Panel B reports the relation between style drift with respect to the B/M dimension and past 
performance. What is clear in both panels is that style ranking is most likely to differ if losses are incurred 
in fund performance. Irrespective of investment style, positioning is likely to change if prior past year 
returns are in the lowest quartile. In fact, outside of the top quartile for both size and BM, statistically 
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significant differences in style ranking are observed across big/small and value/growth characteristics. 
Given that nearly all funds are loss making from the evidence of Table 2 in combination with anticipated 
fees and expenses, the extent of style rotation is not surprising. It would be a safe conclusion to say that it 
is loser funds that switch, and more broadly it would not be unreasonable to conclude that most funds 
switch. This evidence is consistent with that of the US and reported in Chan et al. (2002) and Lynch and 
Musto (2003), and also consistent with more recent work that shows that very few funds offer a persistent 
performance sufficient to warrant a no-change strategy (Barras et al. 2010). In answering our research 
question, style shifting is associated with the lowest levels of fund returns and funds shift styles to improve 
fund returns. We would argue, and evidence in the following section, that this is not active fund 
management within styles but a level of active management in pursuit of a style.  
4.4 What style is pursued? 
Our evidence so far indicates that the style of choice is likely to be altered in the face of poor performance. 
The indications are that this effect occurs irrespective of the existing style, so that no style choice is immune 
to being altered. We look in this section to ascertain what then might be the style of choice when funds 
perform badly and have to rotate. An appropriate clue is provided in Chen and De Bondt (2004) who 
examine all firms within the S&P-500 index between 1976 and 2000 and provide evidence of style 
momentum in a cyclical framework. They find that stocks with characteristics that are currently in favour 
outperform stocks with characteristics that are currently out of favour. They assert that one possible 
explanation for this sort of profit could be as a result of cyclical and structural changes in the macro 
economy.15 It is also well documented that investors chase performance in such a manner (Berk and Green 
2004; Pastor and Stambaugh 2010) and that funds seek to attract investors based on past performance (Jain 
and Wu 2000). We extend this evidence on the grounds that it seems appropriate to explore on the basis of 
defining a ‘currently-in-favour’ characteristic as ‘past winners’ and a currently out-of-favour characteristic 
as ‘past losers’, as calibrated by prior period alpha values. Our expectation is that a combination of alpha 
value and market state will affect fund switching and that, should they switch, they will switch to a style 
more out-of-tune with down-market characteristics and more in-tune with up-market characteristics as 
determined by prior period performance. This is part index tracking and part index-avoidance. Such a view 
is consistent with viewing style investing as product differentiation such that and out-of-sync positioning 
in relation to a market index is required for down markets and in-sync positioning is required for up-markets 
(Chen and De Bondt 2004).  
Our analysis thus focuses on market state as a conditioning variable in fund style choice. We employ the 
definition of market state proposed by Cooper et al. (2004). We define an Up market when the market return 
is non-negative and a Down market when the market return is negative. We use past two-year cumulative 
returns on the FTSE all-share total return index (including dividend) to calculate the market return of the 
UK stock market. 
<Table 5> 
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Table 5 shows that all fund styles exhibit change in Down market states. Whilst we separate winners from 
losers during Down markets there are no significant alpha values for any of the styles reported. Based on 
past performance, all investment styles therefore change. This is evidenced by the significance of all 
estimates for the absolute difference in ranking with t-statistics mostly reported as corresponding to a 1% 
significance level (small style winners are likely to change with a t-statistic at 10% significance level). The 
picture for up-markets is different. Significant alphas are reported for winner portfolios in both size and 
value styles and for three out of four winner styles there are no significant results reported for changes in 
associated style rankings (Winner-Growth styles are likely to change with an alpha of 0.018% per week (t-
stat = 1.81)). For the loser funds during Up market states, no significant alphas are reported but the 
associated style rankings report significant changes (all at 1% significance level). Thus all portfolios in both 
Up and Down markets that report alphas not significantly different from zero are subject to change. The 
change in style is more extensive in Down compared to Up market states. The difference of the difference 
in rankings between Up and Down markets is observable in all style categories and all estimates are 
statistically significant. The interpretation is that, for Down markets, the extent of change in styles is 
significantly larger than it is for Up markets.  
We should note the existence of significant alphas during Up markets. Whilst particularly significant results 
are obtained for value and small size winner funds in neither case are they likely to threaten any reasonable 
estimates of transactions costs. The value alpha is 0.035% per week (1.82% per year) and the small size 
alpha is 0.030% per week (1.58% per year). Notwithstanding these results, of course, fund managers 
invariably report raw returns in annual reports and hence the impression of performance in relation to a 
style benchmark might be somewhat different. 
The result confirms Chen and De Bondt’s (2004) observation that no style is optimal for all periods and 
circumstances and also that style momentum is style rotation. That is, fund managers might track style 
indices but these are quickly subordinated to momentum when alpha performance deteriorates. Our results 
add to those of Chen and De Bondt (2004) inasmuch that we specifically evidence style rotation and report 
the behaviour of styled funds over different market states to reveal how and when momentum justifies style 
rotation. Thus, alpha performance varies most clearly during market changes and, hence, what we observe 
in the results presented here is market-momentum styling, or performance-chasing as largely determined 
by market states. This is not simple index tracking as observed by many researchers but a story of 
investment style shifting as determined by a momentum adjustment process. What we have managed to 
report is to show which styles rotate, why they rotate, and when they rotate.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study reports evidence relating to the UK unit trust investment styles over the period 1987 to 2010 
using a near population sample. We examined fund performance, style preferences, style consistency, and 
what incentives might exist to explain style inconsistency. In relation to fund performance, we generally 
do not observe excess returns when the Carhart (1997) 4F model is employed thus reporting a significant 
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role in the UK for momentum. This is an unusual finding for the UK and we attribute our different results 
to the particular severity of some of the down-markets during our sample period which have yet to be widely 
investigated. We examined which investment styles were likely to be rotated and found that loser portfolios 
with low prior period returns as measured by alpha were most likely to change. However, this result 
appeared irrespective of style (all loser styles changed) and, hence, what became clear is that all future style 
choices are subordinated to past performance. We examined further what role market states play in style 
rotation and confirmed that style conditioning based on prior performance was important in explaining 
changes in style with market states naturally determining the extent of available excess returns.  
Our general conclusion is to confirm that mutual funds chase performance. Our contribution is to show why 
this happened (under poor past performance), how this was brought about (by style rotation using a 
momentum styling) and under what conditions it was most likely to occur (during market down turns). 
Style rotation, we reported, is determined by momentum such that the momentum factor loadings we report 
are, in fact, adjustment processes that are used by funds to search for performance. Momentum investing 
therefore manifests as style rotation. The question of whether this is a strategic intention or strategic default 
may be addressed, but not perhaps conclusively answered, by looking at the evidence of market states: 
momentum is not a style of choice but a style of circumstance. By adopting momentum, fund managers are 
subordinating style choice to a very limited set of criteria: specifically, a single criterion. The only choice 
that fund managers can therefore exercise over a single criterion reduces to whether or not momentum 
should be adopted. At the risk of losing fund inflow and facing fund outflow, all of the managerial 
incentives and the evidence reported here point to one conclusion: adopting momentum is not a choice, and 
style selection is achieved not by strategic intent but by strategic default to prevailing circumstances. 
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Table 1: Description of sample of unit trusts and aggregate performance 
Year Number Unit Trusts FTSE100 FTSE250 FTSE350 FTALLSH FTALSML 
1987 52 16.19 4.81 10.14 6.23 6.64 -- 
1988 53 9.05 1.59 7.01 2.96 3.55 -- 
1989 61 27.25 34.02 20.92 30.80 29.16 -- 
1990 62 –13.19 –10.00 –19.30 –12.09 –13.01 -- 
1991 73 11.74 10.58 8.72 10.11 10.24 -- 
1992 77 22.23 18.79 23.82 19.79 18.86 -- 
1993 81 30.52 22.22 33.28 24.52 25.09 -- 
1994 100 –4.81 –10.58 –7.90 –10.00 –9.78 -- 
1995 112 20.72 18.75 14.08 17.69 17.20 -- 
1996 121 16.83 11.32 11.52 11.36 11.37 -- 
1997 137 21.41 25.49 7.33 21.62 20.52 -- 
1998 157 9.84 14.55 1.40 12.26 10.91 -- 
1999 191 28.36 16.21 32.15 18.54 19.79 56.92 
2000 208 –2.25 –9.04 1.12 –7.55 –7.04 3.20 
2001 237 –13.33 –16.74 –9.87 –15.87 –15.97 –17.02 
2002 284 –21.73 –23.86 –26.57 –24.19 –24.34 –26.55 
2003 315 24.60 13.57 35.15 16.05 16.60 40.03 
2004 354 14.05 7.66 18.85 9.15 9.20 12.46 
2005 415 22.63 16.66 26.82 18.01 18.07 19.65 
2006 466 18.68 11.07 27.55 13.34 13.47 17.30 
2007 505 2.53 3.75 –5.10 2.45 1.94 –12.07 
2008 567 –31.24 –31.56 –39.92 –32.56 –44.68 –32.89 
2009 617 29.10 21.73 46.31 24.16 52.85 24.66 
2010 617 13.66 11.09 24.95 12.75 16.16 12.83 
Mean (1987-2010) 9.90 6.75 6.82 7.06 7.78 8.12 
Standard Deviation 14.82 17.26 17.03 16.80 16.23 15.72 
This table reports the number of the UK unit trusts with at least one observation on weekly return at the end of each calendar year 
from 1987 to 2010. The average weekly returns for the portfolio of unit trusts with available data are compounded over the calendar 
year to obtain annual return. Also reported are annual returns for the FTSE 100 Index (FTSE100), the FTSE 250 Index (FTSE250), 
the FTSE 350 Index (FTSE350), the FTSE All-share Index (FTALLSH), and the FTSE SmallCap Index (FTALSML). The last 
two rows report the mean and standard deviation of annual returns on the portfolio of unit trusts and all market indices over the 
whole sample period. All returns are displayed in percentage. 
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Table 2(a): Performance of unit trusts based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, classified by investment 
styles 
  Growth-25%  2-25%  3-25%  Value-25% 
    Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat 
Panel A: The equally weighted (EW) returns 
Big-25% Alpha 0.0028 0.40  0.0060 0.77  0.0224 1.34  0.0326 1.79* 
 Rm – Rf 0.7110 31.75
***  0.8187 32.42***  0.8106 37.05***  0.8405 30.80*** 
 SMB –0.2361 –3.33***  –0.2049 –3.13***  –0.2852 –3.94***  –0.3172 –4.79*** 
 HML –0.3175 –2.71***  0.1159 1.74*  0.1141 1.81*  0.2196 2.48** 
 Adj. R2 0.518   0.634   0.575   0.462  
2-25% Alpha 0.0054 0.66  0.0113 1.12  0.0379 1.95*  0.0551 2.08** 
 Rm – Rf 0.6439 26.46
***  0.6880 36.73***  0.8057 30.30***  0.8914 31.68*** 
 SMB –0.0932 –2.01**  –0.0746 –2.03**  –0.0705 –1.95*  –0.0878 –2.09** 
 HML –0.5635 –3.39***  0.1228 1.93*  0.1781 2.35**  0.3367 3.65*** 
 Adj. R2 0.525   0.563   0.449   0.543  
3-25% Alpha 0.0058 0.76  0.0184 1.44  0.0431 2.14**  0.0618 2.35** 
 Rm – Rf 0.6792 30.32
***  0.7748 34.92***  0.8317 29.52***  0.8472 33.26*** 
 SMB 0.0418 2.22**  0.0392 2.28**  0.0458 2.20**  0.0568 2.40** 
 HML –0.6564 –3.55***  0.1792 2.37**  0.2319 2.55**  0.4312 3.54*** 
 Adj. R2 0.559   0.452   0.557   0.416  
Small-25% Alpha 0.0096 1.01  0.0358 1.89*  0.0639 2.32**  0.1256 3.40*** 
 Rm – Rf 0.8151 28.67
***  0.8824 31.55***  0.8940 28.17***  0.9046 31.63*** 
 SMB 0.2124 2.94***  0.2993 3.14***  0.3935 3.92***  0.4043 3.97*** 
 HML –0.8221 –3.74***  0.2038 2.46**  0.3230 2.68***  0.4786 3.11*** 
  Adj. R2 0.566   0.497    0.517     0.446   
Panel B: The value weighted (VW) returns 
Big-25% Alpha 0.0022 0.35  0.0044 0.63  0.0188 1.02  0.0270 1.69* 
 Rm – Rf 0.6895 30.83
***  0.6848 34.15***  0.7672 33.75***  0.8200 31.95*** 
 SMB –0.2180 –3.09***  –0.1948 –3.38***  –0.2523 –3.33***  –0.2855 –4.39*** 
 HML –0.2274 –2.36**  0.1011 1.66*  0.1210 1.77*  0.2147 2.32** 
 Adj. R2 0.502   0.579   0.538   0.444  
2-25% Alpha 0.0040 0.54  0.0083 1.06  0.0260 1.61  0.0418 2.30** 
 Rm – Rf 0.6487 27.17
***  0.7469 31.05***  0.7983 28.69***  0.8111 26.59*** 
 SMB –0.0808 –1.79*  –0.0658 –1.71*  –0.0601 –1.65*  –0.0851 –1.93* 
 HML –0.4664 –2.44**  0.1132 1.85*  0.1571 2.02**  0.2576 2.82*** 
 Adj. R2 0.528   0.461   0.435   0.489  
3-25% Alpha 0.0040 0.54  0.0121 1.23  0.0285 1.90*  0.0486 2.23** 
 Rm – Rf 0.7362 26.75
***  0.8362 25.79***  0.8022 25.58***  0.9421 26.19*** 
 SMB 0.0284 1.71*  0.0322 1.78*  0.0354 2.01**  0.0435 2.09** 
 HML –0.6131 –2.83***  0.1390 1.98**  0.1764 2.12**  0.3199 3.33*** 
 Adj. R2 0.505   0.450   0.491   0.514  
Small-25% Alpha 0.0074 0.85  0.0223 1.43  0.0471 2.14**  0.0898 3.20*** 
 Rm – Rf 0.7714 30.71
***  0.8827 26.02***  0.9406 29.40***  0.9844 29.44*** 
 SMB 0.1445 2.04**  0.1676 2.09**  0.2398 2.19**  0.2814 2.35** 
 HML –0.8067 –3.61***  0.1670 2.37**  0.1969 2.53**  0.3487 3.36*** 
  Adj. R2 0.403     0.569     0.482    0.483   
At the end of each year from 1988 to 2009 all UK unit trusts are first sorted by the size loadings and assigned into quartile. Within 
each of the four size classifications, all unit trusts are then sorted by the value loadings and assigned into quartile. Panels A and B 
report the equally weighted (EW) and value weighted (VW) weekly returns, respectively, for each of the resulting 16 portfolios 
over the subsequent one year (which then takes our data period to the end of 2010). The factor loadings are estimated from the 
Fama and French (1993) 3F regressions: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,  where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 
represents the excess weekly return on unit trust i; 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 represents the excess weekly return on the FTSE All Share Index; 
𝑅𝑓,𝑡  represents the weekly 13-week UK Treasury Bill rate; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 represent weekly returns on the zero-investment 
factor-mimicking portfolios for size and B/M factors, respectively; 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 denotes the error term. *, **, or *** indicates that the 
estimated coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2(b): Performance of unit trusts based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, classified by investment styles 
  Growth-25%  2-25%  3-25%  Value-25% 
    Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat  Coeff. t-stat 
Panel A: The equally weighted (EW) returns 
Big-25% Alpha 0.0015 0.16  0.0026 0.35  0.0050 0.59  0.0082 1.17 
 Rm – Rf 0.7037 30.40
***  0.7205 34.86***  0.8958 39.98***  0.8665 30.25*** 
 SMB –0.2239 –3.05***  –0.2157 –3.28***  –0.3275 –4.42***  –0.3623 –4.92*** 
 HML –0.2968 –2.52**  0.1128 1.86*  0.1124 1.73*  0.1888 2.47** 
 MOM –0.0305 –2.82***  –0.0191 –2.06**  0.0150 1.85*  0.0260 2.95*** 
 Adj. R2 0.583   0.682   0.628   0.513  
2-25% Alpha 0.0021 0.23  0.0034 0.46  0.0066 0.66  0.0134 1.18 
 Rm – Rf 0.6199 26.80
***  0.6274 28.56***  0.7482 27.29***  0.8531 32.67*** 
 SMB –0.0970 –2.18**  –0.0857 –2.32**  –0.0768 –2.29**  –0.0866 –2.33** 
 HML –0.4051 –2.92***  0.1282 2.02**  0.1346 2.42**  0.2596 2.94*** 
 MOM –0.0290 –2.34**  0.0143 1.99**  0.0172 1.95*  0.0342 3.03*** 
 Adj. R2 0.585   0.610   0.547   0.577  
3-25% Alpha 0.0027 0.28  0.0037 0.52  0.0074 0.79  0.0146 1.43 
 Rm – Rf 0.6250 25.78
***  0.7634 29.68***  0.8103 29.51***  0.8510 25.48*** 
 SMB 0.0486 2.09**  0.0440 2.21**  0.0487 2.01**  0.0551 2.11** 
 HML –0.5995 –3.45***  0.1832 2.19**  0.1971 2.54**  0.3481 3.57*** 
 MOM 0.0184 2.16**  0.0140 1.97**  0.0181 1.95*  0.0643 4.28*** 
 Adj. R2 0.591   0.503   0.650   0.490  
Small-25% Alpha 0.0035 0.64  0.0145 1.30  0.0185 1.57  0.0268 1.66* 
 Rm – Rf 0.5433 23.46
***  0.6871 25.75***  0.8071 24.08***  0.8706 23.89*** 
 SMB 0.2264 2.96***  0.2943 3.22***  0.3955 3.79***  0.4231 3.41*** 
 HML –0.7418 –3.76***  0.1729 2.30**  0.2833 2.85***  0.4304 4.53*** 
  MOM 0.0151 2.07**  0.0120 1.66*  0.0212 2.07**  0.0843 4.69*** 
 Adj. R2 0.616    0.582     0.599    0.508   
Panel B: The value weighted (VW) returns 
Big-25% Alpha 0.0011 0.14  0.0016 0.16  0.0032 0.30  0.0061 0.59 
 Rm – Rf 0.6710 29.29
***  0.7578 37.52***  0.8004 37.46***  0.6591 29.73*** 
 SMB –0.2102 –2.91***  –0.1948 –3.06***  –0.2551 –3.76***  –0.3209 –4.75*** 
 HML –0.2623 –2.50**  0.1215 1.87*  0.1188 1.72*  0.2236 2.14** 
 MOM –0.0322 –2.68***  –0.0175 –2.11**  0.0148 1.94*  0.0221 2.40** 
 Adj. R2 0.614   0.645   0.585   0.478  
2-25% Alpha 0.0016 0.22  0.0024 0.30  0.0039 0.37  0.0104 1.07 
 Rm – Rf 0.6444 27.87
***  0.6230 26.86***  0.6861 26.91***  0.7958 27.08*** 
 SMB –0.0891 –2.41**  –0.0783 –2.27**  –0.0633 –2.29**  –0.0836 –2.59*** 
 HML –0.5411 –2.85***  0.1481 2.04**  0.1547 2.17**  0.3142 2.62*** 
 MOM –0.0315 –2.54**  –0.0159 –1.90*  0.0228 2.01**  0.0347 3.01*** 
 Adj. R2 0.550   0.533   0.540   0.582  
3-25% Alpha 0.0020 0.28  0.0030 0.37  0.0052 0.69  0.0116 1.22 
 Rm – Rf 0.6212 26.01
***  0.7457 29.53***  0.8164 29.57***  0.8349 31.43*** 
 SMB 0.0424 2.05**  0.0387 2.00**  0.0434 2.17**  0.0445 2.38** 
 HML –0.7635 –3.43***  0.1572 2.01**  0.1662 2.35**  0.3494 3.19*** 
 MOM –0.0202 –2.24**  –0.0156 –2.09**  0.0213 2.02**  0.0674 4.19*** 
 Adj. R2 0.530   0.523   0.545   0.565  
Small-25% Alpha 0.0028 0.34  0.0110 1.32  0.0126 1.43  0.0166 1.56 
 Rm – Rf 0.5535 24.40
***  0.6515 22.59***  0.7240 25.43***  0.8729 28.96*** 
 SMB 0.1912 2.81***  0.2493 2.65***  0.3490 2.84***  0.4037 3.29*** 
 HML –0.8279 –3.86***  0.1884 2.55**  0.2150 2.69***  0.4131 4.27*** 
  MOM –0.0130 –2.00**  –0.0114 –1.74*  0.0249 2.14**  0.0898 4.82*** 
 Adj. R2 0.500     0.591     0.534    0.559   
At the end of each year from 1988 to 2009 all UK unit trusts are first sorted by the size loadings and assigned into quartile. Within 
each of the four size classifications, all unit trusts are then sorted by the value loadings and assigned into quartile. Panels A and B 
report the equally weighted (EW) and value weighted (VW) weekly returns, respectively, for each of the resulting 16 portfolios 
over the subsequent one year (which then takes our data period to the end of 2010). The factor loadings are estimated from the 
Carhart (1997) 4F regressions: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  ,  where 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 
represents the weekly returns on the zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios for momentum factor; other variables are as 
defined in Table 2(a). *, **, or *** indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Correlations and average absolute differences between past and future unit trusts styles 
 Size  B/M 
 Corr. SE-corr. Abs. diff. SE-diff.  Corr. SE-corr. Abs. diff. SE-diff. 
Big Size-25% 0.6465 0.0273** 0.1296 0.0568**  0.2638 0.1552* 0.2616 0.1128** 
Small Size-25% 0.6804 0.0324** 0.0950 0.0559*  0.2970 0.1768* 0.2396 0.1235* 
Value-25% 0.6933 0.0312** 0.1043 0.0596*  0.2891 0.1681* 0.2357 0.1228* 
Growth-25% 0.6045 0.0267** 0.1278 0.0576**   0.2503 0.1517* 0.2731 0.1115** 
ALL 0.6559 0.0290** 0.1198 0.0631*  0.2831 0.1609* 0.2481 0.1154** 
At the end of each year from 1988 to 2009 the past style of each UK unit trust is compared with its future style. The past style of 
a unit trust is measured from its weekly returns over the most recent prior one-year period, and its future style is measured from 
weekly returns over the subsequent one-year period (which then takes our data period to the end of 2010). The style of unit trusts 
with respect to size and to B/M is its loadings on the size and B/M factors, respectively, estimated from the Carhart (1997) 4F 
regressions. All variables are as defined in Tables 2(a) and 2(b). Style measures (past or future) for all unit trusts are ranked each 
year and rescaled from zero (the lowest-ranked unit trust) to one (the highest-ranked unit trust). This table reports the simple 
correlation between past and future style ranks pooled over unit trusts and over years. Also reported is the average absolute 
difference between past and future style ranks, along with the pooled standard error (SE) reported for all unit trusts, Big size and 
Small size groups (unit trusts in the top 25% and bottom 25%, respectively, when sorted each year by style ranks on size), as well 
as Value and Growth groups (unit trusts in the top 25% and bottom 25% when sorted each year by style ranks on B/M). At the 
end of each year, the SE of correlation coefficient and difference between the past and future ranks is calculated. For example, the 
SE of the correlation coefficient at the end of 1988 is computed as: 
𝑆𝐸1988 = [(1 − 𝑟1988
2 )/(𝑛1988 − 2)]
1 2⁄ , with 𝑛1988 − 2 degrees of freedom, 
where 𝑛1988 is the number of observations of weekly returns at the end of 1988.  
The pooled SE for each year from 1988 to 2009 is computed as: 
𝑆𝐸𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑 = [
(𝑛1988 − 1)𝑆𝐸1988
2  + (𝑛1989 − 1)𝑆𝐸1989
2  + … + (𝑛2009 − 1)𝑆𝐸2009
2
𝑛1988 + 𝑛1989 + … + 𝑛2009 − 22
]
1 2⁄
. 
* or ** indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant at 10% or 5% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Shifts in unit trust styles based on the two-way within-group classifications 
  Alpha t-Alpha Past ranking Future ranking Abs. diff. t-diff. 
Panel A: Unit trust styles with respect to size 
Winner-25% Big-25% 0.0137 1.08 0.6985 0.6438 0.1071 1.69** 
 2-25% 0.0169 1.25 0.4246 0.3233 0.0859 0.89 
 3-25% 0.0170 1.44 0.2785 0.2610 0.0822 0.88 
 Small-25% 0.0195 1.64 0.1330 0.1284 0.0703 0.66 
2-25% Big 0.0056 0.41 0.7373 0.6219 0.1581 2.52** 
 2 0.0075 0.65 0.4941 0.3812 0.1445 2.35** 
 3 0.0082 0.75 0.3989 0.3104 0.1186 1.78* 
 Small 0.0097 0.96 0.1725 0.1258 0.0809 0.71 
3-25% Big 0.0045 0.44 0.7621 0.6330 0.1522 2.46** 
 2 0.0051 0.53 0.4743 0.3842 0.1356 2.34** 
 3 0.0049 0.50 0.3772 0.2807 0.1199 1.95* 
 Small 0.0067 0.63 0.1627 0.1196 0.0926 1.67* 
Loser-25% Big-25% 0.0025 0.37 0.8272 0.6511 0.1981 2.87*** 
 2-25% 0.0038 0.40 0.5239 0.3658 0.1861 2.42** 
 3-25% 0.0036 0.41 0.5101 0.3739 0.1790 2.32** 
 Small-25% 0.0046 0.44 0.2022 0.1360 0.1294 2.02** 
Panel B: Unit trust styles with respect to B/M 
Winner-25% Value-25% 0.0199 1.75* 0.8316 0.7693 0.1710 1.11 
 2-25% 0.0168 1.63 0.6608 0.6109 0.2052 1.58 
 3-25% 0.0163 1.57 0.6463 0.5570 0.2224 1.74* 
 Growth-25% 0.0116 1.15 0.4583 0.5245 0.2505 2.16** 
2-25% Value 0.0102 1.06 0.7979 0.7533 0.2067 1.46 
 2 0.0099 0.97 0.5931 0.6186 0.2298 1.89** 
 3 0.0098 0.92 0.5475 0.6112 0.2619 2.54** 
 Growth 0.0076 0.78 0.3783 0.4331 0.3038 3.34*** 
3-25% Value 0.0075 0.86 0.6127 0.6866 0.2078 1.61 
 2 0.0064 0.68 0.3962 0.4478 0.2235 1.87* 
 3 0.0061 0.59 0.3642 0.4170 0.2721 2.55** 
 Growth 0.0047 0.50 0.2606 0.3391 0.3137 3.60*** 
Loser-25% Value-25% 0.0056 0.66 0.5074 0.6189 0.2365 1.93* 
 2-25% 0.0046 0.53 0.2722 0.3453 0.2454 2.08** 
 3-25% 0.0042 0.47 0.2254 0.3178 0.2978 3.20*** 
  Growth-25% 0.0037 0.37 0.1275 0.2868 0.3860 3.84*** 
At the end of each year from 1988 to 2009, all UK unit trusts are first sorted by the past one-year compounding returns and 
assigned into quartile. Within each of the four past return classifications, all unit trusts are then sorted by the size rankings in Panel 
A or B/M rankings in Panel B and assigned into quartile. The style of unit trusts with respect to size and to B/M is its loadings on 
the size and B/M factors, respectively, estimated from the Carhart (1997) 4F regressions. The past style of each portfolio with 
respect to size and B/M is then compared with its future style. For each of the resulting 16 portfolios, the simple average for the 
size or B/M characteristic ranks across all member unit trusts is calculated at the end of the portfolio formation year to give the 
past style of the portfolio and at the end of the subsequent year to give its future style (which then takes our data period to the end 
of 2010). The weighted average across all portfolio formation years is reported in the table, where the weights are the number of 
unit trust observations in each year. Also reported is the weighted average of the mean absolute differences over years between 
the past and future characteristic ranks across all unit trusts within a portfolio. *, **, or *** indicates that the estimated coefficient 
is significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Shifts in unit trust styles following market states 
  Down markets  Up markets  Test for equality (Down – Up) 
  Alpha t-Alpha 
Past 
ranking 
Future 
ranking 
Abs. 
Diff. 
t-diff.  Alpha t-Alpha 
Past 
ranking 
Future 
ranking 
Abs. 
Diff. 
t-diff.  t-diff. 
Panel A: The style of unit trusts with respect to size 
Winner-25% Big-25% 0.0077 0.57 0.7148 0.5735 0.2307 3.11***  0.0203 1.72** 0.6543 0.5613 0.0791 1.02  2.11** 
 2-25% 0.0083 0.73 0.4824 0.3604 0.1655 2.01**  0.0229 1.85* 0.4400 0.3951 0.0679 0.85  2.11** 
 3-25% 0.0099 0.74 0.3615 0.2323 0.1472 1.93*  0.0247 2.21** 0.3875 0.3343 0.0681 0.88  2.19** 
 Small-25% 0.0110 1.16 0.2167 0.1632 0.1371 1.92*  0.0303 2.57*** 0.1331 0.1066 0.0593 0.51  1.79* 
2-25% Big 0.0037 0.46 0.7428 0.5774 0.2403 2.25**  0.0112 1.39 0.7064 0.5987 0.1271 1.85*  2.12** 
 2 0.0054 0.51 0.4926 0.3518 0.2045 2.01**  0.0163 1.46 0.4303 0.3683 0.1069 1.63  2.18** 
 3 0.0056 0.52 0.4643 0.2892 0.2023 1.98**  0.0167 1.47 0.3219 0.2896 0.0932 1.45  2.22** 
 Small 0.0067 0.59 0.2152 0.1278 0.1542 1.94*  0.0201 1.73* 0.1551 0.1252 0.0718 1.22  2.36** 
3-25% Big 0.0026 0.38 0.7778 0.5884 0.2661 2.54
**  0.0078 1.15 0.6717 0.6147 0.1573 2.31**  2.26** 
 2 0.0035 0.43 0.5079 0.3999 0.2186 2.26**  0.0106 1.36 0.4788 0.3809 0.1358 2.05**  2.36** 
 3 0.0045 0.46 0.4736 0.3207 0.2071 2.13**  0.0135 1.75* 0.2744 0.2571 0.1193 1.99**  2.38** 
 Small 0.0055 0.63 0.1996 0.1028 0.1716 1.99**  0.0165 1.91* 0.1770 0.1320 0.0885 1.42  2.44** 
Loser-25% Big-25% 0.0012 0.21 0.8602 0.6159 0.3148 3.63***  0.0056 0.74 0.7928 0.6594 0.1654 2.49**  2.61*** 
 2-25% 0.0015 0.23 0.5533 0.3764 0.2533 3.01***  0.0061 0.86 0.5146 0.4590 0.1419 2.25**  2.68*** 
 3-25% 0.0016 0.28 0.5563 0.2623 0.2489 2.82***  0.0064 0.99 0.4118 0.3494 0.1318 2.01**  2.70*** 
 Small-25% 0.0018 0.29 0.3473 0.1415 0.2252 3.06***  0.0073 1.06 0.1841 0.1453 0.1313 1.88*  2.05** 
Continued 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
  Down markets  Up markets  Test for equality (Down – Up) 
  Alpha t-Alpha 
Past 
ranking 
Future 
ranking 
Abs. 
Diff. 
t-diff.  Alpha t-Alpha 
Past 
ranking 
Future 
ranking 
Abs. 
Diff. 
t-diff.  t-diff. 
Panel B: The style of unit trusts with respect to B/M 
Winner-25% Value-25% 0.0111 1.06 0.7904 0.5770 0.2327 2.57***  0.0349 2.69*** 0.8649 0.6812 0.0652 1.01  1.83* 
 2-25% 0.0100 1.02 0.5968 0.4435 0.2638 2.64***  0.0251 1.98** 0.6393 0.5174 0.1543 1.29  2.25** 
 3-25% 0.0098 0.99 0.5677 0.4238 0.3230 3.01***  0.0220 1.82* 0.6060 0.4417 0.1865 1.65**  2.27** 
 Growth-25% 0.0090 0.94 0.4061 0.2301 0.3780 3.47***  0.0178 1.81* 0.5022 0.3644 0.1116 1.91*  2.36** 
2-25% Value 0.0059 0.65 0.6785 0.5109 0.2649 2.65***  0.0222 1.89* 0.8281 0.6048 0.1818 1.66*  2.23** 
 2 0.0047 0.59 0.5354 0.4261 0.2825 2.89***  0.0142 1.74* 0.5763 0.4405 0.2031 1.78*  2.33** 
 3 0.0042 0.56 0.5069 0.4116 0.3008 3.12***  0.0114 1.52 0.5217 0.4254 0.2183 1.85*  2.36** 
 Growth 0.0031 0.44 0.3048 0.1864 0.3376 3.26***  0.0077 0.89 0.3116 0.3365 0.2367 1.99**  2.47** 
3-25% Value 0.0039 0.62 0.5256 0.5910 0.2703 2.68***  0.0116 1.56 0.6423 0.5556 0.1944 1.74*  2.34** 
 2 0.0035 0.58 0.3435 0.3021 0.2929 2.99***  0.0102 1.48 0.4422 0.3357 0.2033 1.88*  2.56*** 
 3 0.0034 0.41 0.3264 0.2979 0.3057 3.15***  0.0098 1.00 0.4329 0.3064 0.2349 2.01**  2.68*** 
 Growth 0.0023 0.26 0.1907 0.2227 0.3275 3.26***  0.0059 0.75 0.2556 0.2679 0.2538 2.23**  2.74*** 
Loser-25% Value-25% 0.0026 0.21 0.4871 0.6604 0.3478 3.16***  0.0085 1.11 0.5606 0.6383 0.2127 2.61**  2.13** 
 2-25% 0.0021 0.20 0.2619 0.2642 0.3446 3.34***  0.0070 1.01 0.2441 0.2696 0.2439 1.98**  2.99*** 
 3-25% 0.0020 0.19 0.2477 0.2304 0.3676 3.55***  0.0066 0.88 0.2265 0.2758 0.2566 2.25**  3.01*** 
 growth-25% 0.0018 0.17 0.1073 0.3212 0.4190 3.78***   0.0049 0.71 0.1579 0.3155 0.2825 3.17***   2.74*** 
At the end of each year from 1988 to 2009, all UK unit trusts are first sorted by the past one-year compounding returns and assigned into two classifications (Winner and Loser contain unit trusts in 
the top 25% and the bottom 25%, respectively). Within each classification, all unit trusts are then sorted by the size rankings in Panel A or B/M rankings in Panel B and assigned into two classifications 
(Big and Small contain unit trusts in the top 25% and the bottom 25%). The style of unit trusts with respect to size and to B/M is its loadings on the size and B/M factors, respectively, estimated from 
the Carhart (1997) 4F regressions. The past style of each portfolio with respect to size and B/M is then compared with its future style for each of the resulting 8 portfolios, following the Up and Down 
markets. Like Cooper et al. (2004), we define an Up (Down) market when past two-year cumulative returns of the FTSE All-share Index is non-negative (negative). The simple average for the size or 
B/M characteristic ranks across all member unit trusts is calculated at the end of the portfolio formation year to give the past style of the portfolio and at the end of the subsequent year to give its future 
style. The weighted average across all portfolio formation years is reported in the table, where the weights are the number of unit trust observations in each year. The weighted average of the mean 
absolute differences over years between the past and future characteristic ranks across all unit trusts within a portfolio is reported. Also reported are the robust t-statistics for the test of the equality of 
adjusted profits and mean absolute differences across Down and Up markets. *, **, or *** indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant at 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
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Endnotes 
1  It is theoretically inappropriate because it is logically inconsistent with superior information as it assumes homogenous 
expectations and, as a consequence, abnormal performance can only be observed due to the mean-variance inefficiency. CAPM is 
empirically unsuitable because of the varied and well-documented anomalies presented in its application. Additionally, the failing 
of CAPM in fund performance is that it demonstrates that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient but cannot offer a 
prescription about which subsets of the economy are mean-variance efficient. 
2 The method of calculation of abnormal returns requires the construction of a benchmark portfolio with near-identical style 
characteristics as that of the fund being examined. The method then proceeds in one of two directions. The first direction involves 
the calculation of returns of both actual and benchmarked portfolios over the sampling frequency period to produce a time series 
from which a regression abnormal performance may be detected. In this respect, the approach of calculating abnormal performance 
is identical to the factor method (Grinblatt and Titman 1989a). The factor loadings from the regression then determine portfolio 
weights from which abnormal returns are detected. The second direction matches each stock to a benchmark, based on style 
characteristics, as before. A return difference between the two is then calculated and, in the additional step that justifies the label 
‘direct’, the actual portfolio weights are applied to the differences to form abnormal performance, or benchmark-adjusted 
calculations of fund performance (Daniel et al. 1997). 
3 This relates to the question of fund manager timing ability which can produce Jensen measures that are difficult to interpret. 
Consistent with nearly every researcher who has looked at this issue, we do not find timing ability of fund managers in our sample. 
In common with Grinblatt and Titman (1989a), we reject the impact of the sensitivity of the Jensen measure to timing issues as 
being empirically unimportant. 
4 The only requirement in such instances is that the k-factors are locally mean-variance efficient (Grinblatt and Titman 1985).  
5 We exclude unauthorised unit trusts due to the insufficient information to confirm their investment objectives. UK equity unit 
trusts have at least 80% of the fund invested in the UK equities. By restricting funds to those investing in UK equity, more accurate 
market benchmarks may be used (Cuthbertson et al. 2008). 
6 The FTSE 100 Index includes the largest 100 blue-chip companies, representing approximately 80% of the capitalisation of the 
UK market. The FTSE 250 Value Index comprises the mid-capitalised 250 value stocks in the market, while the FTSE 250 Growth 
Index contains the mid-capitalised 250 growth companies. The FTSE All-Small Index is a combination of the FTSE SmallCap 
Index and the FTSE Fledging Index. The FTSE SmallCap Index includes all the companies, representing the bottom 2% of the 
market capitalisation and the FTSE Fledging Index, which contains companies that are too small to be included in FTSE All-Share 
Index. Finally, the FTSE All-Share Index is an aggregation of the FTSE 100, the FTSE 250 and the FTSE All-Small Indices. 
Statistically, the index represents 98-99% of the UK market capitalisation. The FTSE 100 Value Index, the FTSE 100 Growth 
Index, the FTSE 250 Value Index, and the FTSE 250 Growth Index have been replaced by the FTSE Style Index in 2008. 
7 See http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfclose.htm – refer to the 5th bullet point on this page. 
8 Thus, profitable momentum might be ‘feasible’ in the face of transaction costs, we would argue, but the detail is impossible for 
any researcher to determine with accuracy for the following reason: no known measure of ‘soft dollar’ costs looks to be observable 
but which is a generally agreed component of transactions costs for most funds (see, e.g., Haslem 2006).  
9 Employing the null that alpha is equal to zero in a 3F model is equivalent to saying that unsystematic risk captured by the error 
term is un-priced (Ferson and Harvey 1999). As we will show, this null is likely to be rejected in the 3F model but is likely to be 
accepted in the 4F model, thus validating our approach to employ momentum as a device explaining fund style rotation. 
10 A total of 489 and 427 unit trusts have a significant momentum variable in Tables 2(a) and 2(b), respectively.  
11 The basis of approach is adopted by major fund trackers, such as Morningstar and Lipper. Chan et al. (2002) also analyse the 
style of mutual funds along similar dimensions. 
12 We calculate but do not report style timing results using the Fama and French (1993) 3F model. Overall, we conclude that the 
trust managers do not possess the ability to time market, size, or value factors. Our results are consistent with previous literature 
which is why we do not report them (see, e.g., Treynor and Mazuy 1966; Henriksson and Merton 1981; Chang and Lewellen 1984;  
Chan et al. 2002 for US mutual funds; and Fletcher 1995; Byrne et al. 2006; Cuthbertson et al. 2008 for UK unit trusts). 
13 Results from the Fama and French (1993) 3F model and value weighting are available on request. The results do not alter any of 
the conclusions to follow. 
14 The t-statistic is the difference of the average between the past and future characteristic ranks. Its estimated standard error is the 
standard error of the difference between two ranks. 
15 Based on a sample of the FTSE 350 stocks, Aarts and Lehnert (2005) investigate the profitability of style momentum strategies 
but find less profitable and more risky returns compared with regular momentum strategies, the results of which contrast with the 
evidence in the US reported by Chen and De Bondt (2004). 
                                                 
 
